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During the 1930 and 40s, an age of ‘revolution’ in economics, the ‘new welfare economics’ 
(hereafter NWE) became an autonomous, highly technical discipline within mathematical 
economics. This revolution is associated with Paul Samuelson’s (1947) Foundations of 
Economic Analysis.
ii
 While its formulae were developed within a utilitarian, moral philosophical 
framework, by focusing on ‘revealed preferences,’ NWE dispensed with the psychological 
commitments of utilitarianism and it could explore the formal characteristics of social choice 
without, so it claimed, highly contested psychological and moral judgments.
iii
 This development 
fit well with the technocratic self-conception of a burgeoning field that was about to become the 
privileged policy science (displacing, law, history, civil engineering etc.)   
 
George Stigler – winner of the 1982 Nobel Prize in economics -- argued in 1943 that NWE 
assumes a question-begging consensus over values in a given society.
iv
 In response, Samuelson 
never denies this; Samuelson focuses on some technical mistakes in Stigler’s examples, ridicules 
Stigler’s tacit elitism (“frankness necessitates the regrettable admission that neither the old nor 
new welfare economics qualifies as sprightly conversation in the Dale Carnegie, the Oscar 
Wilde, or even the Oxford Movement sense,”) and insists that NWE applies only to “a limited set 
of pairs of situations, it does tell us which would be better if we had the choice between them,” 
(emphases in original).
v
 Samuelson insists that NWE rests on “the relatively mild assumptions 
that (1) "more" goods are "better" than "less" goods; (2) individual tastes are to "count" in the 
sense that it is "better" if all individuals are "better" off.”vi 
  
This seems to have ended debate over NWE within economics for several decades. Officially, 
the stance of the profession echoed Samuelson’s deflationary position about the aspirations of 
NWE,
vii
 but in practice it provided a “professional consensus” for so-called ‘applied’ welfare 
economics, “to increase, to society's general benefit, the influence on public policy of good 
economic analysis.”viii  
 
Cropsey’s 1955 paper challenges NWE on philosophical grounds. Cropsey was well-placed for 
this because he got a PhD in economics from Columbia University in 1952, where he overlapped 
with Stigler, who was on faculty; Columbia was home to Abraham Bergson, who wrote one of 
the seminal papers developing NWE.
ix
 When he published in Ethics, Cropsey was still a member 
of the economics profession.
x
  
 
From the current vantage point, Cropsey’s most prescient criticism of NWE is this: “The 
political consequence of [NWE--ES]...is that the maximum satisfaction of preferences takes 
precedence over the maximum satisfaction of the requirements of justice as the norm of the 
common good.” (124) Restated in Rawlsian terms, Cropsey notes that as a theory of social 
choice, NWE simply assumes the priority of the Good over the Right without argument. Echoing 
a familiar criticism, Cropsey claims that “that there does not exist in modern welfare economics 
a description of optimal distribution conditions based upon a reasoned conception of justice.” 
(122) 
 
Given that, as Cropsey notes, NWE abstracts away from institutions, including institution of 
justice,
xi
 it is no surprise that “The practically decisive differences between polities are 
subordinated to their common economic property: they must all serve to gratify in the highest 
degree the arbitrary preferences of irreducible individuals,” (124; emphasis added). So, unlike 
Rawls, who emphasizes that ultimately NWE is a representative agent theory (1971: 24), 
Cropsey focuses on NWE’s official commitment to individualism (recall Samuelson’s second 
assumption above): “welfare or the good is again conceived as, for every man, unique.” (124) 
Cropsey’s distinct criticism (with shades of natural law theory or moral rationalism) is that 
ultimately NWE rests on brute facts (“idiosyncratic preferences,” (116)) which can never be the 
basis of an adequate conception of Right. It’s as if Cropsey is appealing to the principle of 
sufficient reason here.  
 
In conclusion, I note three general features of Cropsey’s criticism of NWE: first, his apparent 
rejection of the doctrine of what he calls “Individualism.” (124) It is surprising to see this 
rejection at the height of the McCarthy era. Second, Cropsey hints at a kind of natural law 
doctrine: “the entire structure of modern welfare economics…would need reconstruction upon a 
plan the profoundest characteristic of which would be the affirmation of a human nature that 
transcends the feelings of individuals as such.” (124)  
 
Third, Cropsey has decidedly metaphysical leanings; he writes, for example: 
[T]he foregoing discussion implies that the mathematical method, like every method, 
has a supra-methodical meaning; every logic presupposes a metaphysic. This is 
eminently true of mathematics as a method of inquiry in welfare economics…In so far 
as the application of mathematical analysis to welfare economics either relies upon or 
itself creates the presumption that (1) knowledge of the flux of a thing is possible in the 
absence of knowledge of the nature of the thing… (118) 
The key insight lurking in this abstruse bit of reasoning is that if Samuelson’s self-understanding 
is taken at face value, then when applied to empirical reality, NWE offers knowledge of 
(hypothetical) relations, not a substantive conception (of Right) worth having. But according to 
Cropsey even these relations are an “aggregate of the preferences of an unclassified human 
heterogeneity vis-a-vis an unclassified heterogeneity of goods and services;” they have non-
trivial metaphysical commitments: “The mathematical characterization of welfare rests upon a 
far-reaching assumption as to the role and meaning of species or natural differences among 
classes of things. In effect it denies those natural specific differences, replacing them by genera 
each of which is a spectrum of irreducible individuals. But genera not composed of species ought 
to be called aggregations, or perhaps assortments. The mathematical view of welfare flows from 
a rearrangement of natural things which is as much a de-ordering as a re-ordering.” (124) One 
need not share Cropsey’s metaphysical commitments, to recognize that he is correct that in 
addition to having undesirable moral consequences, when applied, NWE is also a controversial 
social ontology.   
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